Executive Summary
The Cost-Benefit Analysis recommended proceeding with Project Catalyst on a conditional basis: a positive NPV of $2,968,904 and an 8.94% IRR that clears the 8% hurdle by a modest margin, explicitly “conditioned on disciplined benefit tracking”. This plan is that condition, made into an instrument. It names who owns each of the four benefit streams, what each reports before any dollar is realized, and how the annual benefits audit — which the Closeout Report already assumes exists — actually runs.
1 · Why this program needs the plan the other four did not
Every suite in this portfolio has a benefits plan, and each makes a different argument. Catalyst’s is the sharpest, because Catalyst’s business case is the only one that is conditional on its own execution. The federal case handed benefits to another party; the PM case handed them to another department; the agile case could actually read them. This case can do none of those things — it has to earn a return that a single slip can erase.
This document supplies the instrument. It does three things the CBA deliberately left to a later artifact: it assigns each benefit stream a single accountable owner; it defines the leading indicators that show whether a benefit is on track to realize, years before it realizes in cash; and it specifies the annual audit that the closeout report already promises but that nothing in the suite had yet defined.
2 · Benefit register
Four streams, totalling $27,200,000 at full run-rate. No stream is invented — each is a row of the CBA benefit model, here given an owner, a leading measure and a link to the RAIDD risk that most threatens it.
| ID | Benefit stream | Run-rate | Share | Source | Accountable owner | Chief threat |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| BEN-01 | Claims & PA automation and labour | $12,800,000 | 47% | BRD-01 | T. Valdez — PMO / benefits owner | R-01 |
| BEN-02 | PA & claims fraud / waste detection | $2,400,000 | 9% | BRD-01 | T. Valdez — PMO / benefits owner | R-01 |
| BEN-03 | Member & provider experience and deflection | $8,800,000 | 32% | BRD-02 | G. Okonkwo — Change Lead | R-07 |
| BEN-04 | Underwriting risk and productivity | $3,200,000 | 12% | BRD-03 | S. Khurana — AI Governance | R-03 |
| Total full run-rate annual benefit | $27,200,000 | 100% | Reconciles to CBA §3 | |||
3 · What each stream reports before it realizes
Because no benefit produces cash during the three-year build, the plan reports leading indicators throughout. A leading indicator shows whether the capability that produces a benefit is arriving on schedule; it is not the benefit, and the plan never reports it as one. But it is the only thing that can be read in Years 1–3, and reading nothing for three years on a case this exposed would be negligent (BG-03).
| ID | Leading indicators (read from pilot / go-live onward) | Source of record |
|---|---|---|
| BEN-01 | Auto-adjudication rate on routine prior-auth · manual-review hours per 1,000 requests · median decision turnaround | BRD-01 production telemetry · CoE dashboards |
| BEN-02 | Flagged-pattern precision and recall against confirmed cases · dollars of inappropriate spend recovered or avoided | BRD-01 production telemetry · CoE dashboards |
| BEN-03 | Virtual-assistant containment rate · agent-assist handle time · adoption by channel and by role | BRD-02 production telemetry · CoE dashboards |
| BEN-04 | Underwriter throughput post-validation · risk-selection lift vs the pre-model baseline, measured only after independent validation | BRD-03 production telemetry · CoE dashboards |
One measurement rule governs all four. Underwriting (BEN-04) may not report a risk-selection lift until the model has passed independent validation — the CBA models that benefit “post independent validation” for a reason. Reporting a lift from an unvalidated model is how a benefit case comes to rest on a number the model was never entitled to produce.
4 · The ramp is a commitment, not a forecast
The CBA’s ramp curve is often read as prudence — a conservative estimate of how fast benefits arrive. For benefits realization it is the opposite: it is the schedule the program is committing to hit. Each year’s figure is a checkpoint, and a miss is reported as a miss, not absorbed by sliding the curve to the right.
| Year | Phase | Realization | Gross benefit | What must be true |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | Build & pilot | 0% | $0 | BRD-01 pilot only; no production volume |
| Year 2 | BRD-01 ramp + BRD-02/03 pilot | 25% | $6,800,000 | BRD-01 in production; BRD-02/03 in pilot |
| Year 3 | Expansion & optimization | 55% | $14,960,000 | BRD-02 to production; BRD-03 ramping |
| Year 4 | Sustained operations | 85% | $23,120,000 | All BRDs in steady state on the trailing edge of the ramp |
| Year 5 | Full run-rate | 100% | $27,200,000 | All systems optimized; full benefit capture |
5 · The annual benefits audit
The Closeout Report states that benefits ownership transfers to ACME’s AI Center of Excellence and Finance, who “continue the benefits audit annually,” with the first audit 90 days after closeout. Until this plan, that audit had no defined scope, owners or cadence — the closeout was pointing at a control that did not exist. Here is the control.
| Element | Definition |
|---|---|
| Owner after closeout | ACME AI Center of Excellence (measurement) with Finance (validation of realized dollars). During the program, T. Valdez (PMO) owns it. |
| First audit | 90 days after closeout — a leading-indicator read, not a realized-dollar read, because the ramp is early. It confirms the four streams are instrumented and their measures are flowing. |
| Annual audit | Each year to Year 10, comparing realized benefit to the ramp commitment for that year, and realized run-state cost to the $9,500,000 model line. |
| Against what | The CBA ramp (this document §4) for benefit, and the FinOps guardrail for run-state cost. Attribution compares to the pre-model operating baseline, not to the preceding year. |
| Escalation | Any stream tracking more than one ramp step behind, or any run-state overrun, is reported to the Steering Board as a benefit-case event with the NPV implication attached. |
6 · What the numbers depend on — and what happens when they move
The CBA’s sensitivity analysis is not decoration; it is the list of things the audit must watch, because each is a lever on a case with little slack. Restated as benefit-realization exposures:
| Driver | RAIDD risk | NPV downside | What the audit watches |
|---|---|---|---|
| Prior-auth volume & baseline cost | R-01 | up to −$8.4M | Auto-adjudication volume and the $30/request baseline holding — the dominant value driver |
| Benefit-ramp delay | R-07 (adoption) | −$5.1M | Each BRD go-live date; adoption curves from pilot — downside-only, and alone enough to flip the case |
| Model incident forcing a pause | R-03 | −$2.3M | The AI-governance controls that keep BRD-02 member-facing services live — a pause is a direct benefit loss |
| Compute-cost escalation | R-02 | −$1.8M | The FinOps guardrail on run-state cost — erodes net benefit, never adds to it |
All four downsides are one-directional or heavily skewed to the downside. That asymmetry is the whole reason benefit tracking is a condition of approval: the case has real upside if execution is clean, but its risks subtract without a matching chance to add. An audit that only reported realized dollars would see these too late; an audit that watches the four leading drivers sees them while there is still time to act.
7 · What the model does not capture
The CBA lists indirect benefits it deliberately excluded from the NPV: a governed AI capability that improves ACME’s regulatory posture ahead of tightening AI-in-insurance oversight; a reusable platform and Center of Excellence that lower the cost of every future AI use case; member and provider experience gains with second-order revenue effects; and durable in-house AI/MLOps capability. These are real and they are correctly outside the model — a benefits plan that quietly monetized them to pad the case would undermine the discipline the whole document exists to enforce.
8 · Open gaps
Recorded with owners rather than left implicit. None is a defect in another artifact except BG-01 and BG-02, which are — and both are fixable in the documents named.
| ID | Gap | Detail | Recommended action | Owner |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BG-01 High | The closeout report asserts a benefits audit that has no instrument behind it | The Closeout Report states that benefits ownership transfers to ACME’s AI Center of Excellence and Finance, who will “continue the benefits audit annually,” with the first audit 90 days after closeout “per the CBA governance plan.” No such governance plan or audit instrument existed until this document. The closeout was asserting a control that had not been built — exactly the silent-drift failure the CBA warned against when it made benefit tracking a condition of approval. | This plan is that instrument. It defines the audit scope, the four stream owners, the leading measures each reports, and the cadence. Register it as the referent the closeout already points to. | T. Valdez |
| BG-02 Medium | The CBA cites risk IDs that do not exist in the RAIDD Log | The CBA §8 ties the benefit case to four risks it labels RSK-01, RSK-02, RSK-03 and RSK-07. The RAIDD Log has no RSK- series; the corresponding risks are R-01 (legacy claims data), R-02 (compute cost), R-03 (chatbot incident) and R-07 (adoption). The mapping is unambiguous and the content matches, but a reader following the reference lands on nothing. Since the benefit case is directly exposed to these four risks, a broken pointer here is worse than cosmetic. | Correct the four references in the CBA to R-01/02/03/07, or add an RSK→R legend. This plan uses the RAIDD IDs throughout so its own traceability holds regardless. | T. Valdez |
| BG-03 Medium | No benefit can be read during the three-year build, yet the case turns on the build finishing on time | The ramp recognizes 0% in Year 1 and 25% in Year 2. The sensitivity analysis shows a single six-month ramp delay per BRD removes $5.10M of NPV — more than the entire $2,968,904 base-case NPV, flipping the program negative. So the one thing the case is most exposed to is invisible on any benefit measure for the first two years. What can be read early is leading: go-live dates, adoption curves and auto-adjudication rates from BRD-01 pilot, not dollars. | Track the BRD-01 leading indicators from pilot, and treat any slip in a BRD go-live date as a benefit-case event reported to the Steering Board, not only as a schedule event. | G. Okonkwo |
| BG-04 Medium | The largest benefit stream depends on the weakest data | BEN-01 is $12,800,000 — 47% of the case — and it depends on legacy claims data quality, which is R-01, the highest-scored risk on the program at 9. The benefit and its principal threat are the same data. If R-01 is not retired, the benefit does not ramp, and no amount of model quality compensates. | Gate the BEN-01 ramp on an R-01 data-readiness measure, published before BRD-01 leaves pilot, rather than assuming data quality and discovering the shortfall in the realized number. | T. Valdez |
| BG-05 Note | Run-state cost is netted in the CBA but has no benefit-side owner | The model nets $9,500,000 a year of run-state cost — cloud, model monitoring, retraining and CoE operations — against gross benefit from Year 4. Compute cost (R-02) is downside-only in the sensitivity: it can erode net benefit but never adds to it. Yet no stream owner is accountable for holding that line; it sits in Finance, one step removed from the benefit it offsets. | Make the FinOps compute guardrail a named input to the annual benefits audit, so a run-state overrun surfaces as a reduction in net benefit rather than as a separate cost report nobody reconciles. | W. Kumar |
9 · Realization status
| Stream | Status | Basis |
|---|---|---|
| BEN-01 · Claims & PA | Instrumented, pre-ramp | BRD-01 leading indicators defined; realization begins Year 2. Gated on R-01 data readiness (BG-04). |
| BEN-02 · Fraud / waste | Instrumented, pre-ramp | Rides BRD-01; precision/recall measures defined against confirmed cases. |
| BEN-03 · Experience / deflection | Instrumented, pre-ramp | Depends on frontline adoption (R-07); containment and handle-time measures defined. |
| BEN-04 · Underwriting | Instrumented, gated | May not report a lift until independent validation clears — the last stream to produce a readable number. |
10 · Approval
| Name | Role | Basis of approval |
|---|---|---|
| C. Tyrrell | Program Director (author) | Register completeness and reconciliation to the CBA 10-year model |
| T. Valdez | PMO / benefits owner | Owns the audit during the program and the BEN-01/02 streams |
| S. Khurana | AI Governance | Owns BEN-04 and the validation gate; owns the R-03 incident exposure |
| G. Okonkwo | Change Lead | Owns BEN-03 and the adoption curve the deflection benefit depends on |
| Executive Steering Board | Governance | Accepts the audit as the enforcement of the CBA’s conditions of approval, and the escalation path for a slipped ramp |