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Gate 5 Post-Launch Review

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⚠ This document is an illustrative end-state sample — read this first

Every other artifact in this suite sits at the 16 October 2026 status date, with the program mid-flight in Stage 2. This one is dated 07 September 2028 and reports actuals that cannot exist yet. It is included because the suite is deliberately documented mid-flight, and that framing carries one risk: a reader concluding the program never delivered. This shows how the program ends.

It is deliberately NOT reconciled against the Program Dashboard, the Gate 2 Readiness Assessment or the Gate Conditions Register. Those documents describe October 2026; this one describes September 2028. Where they disagree, they are supposed to.

Program timeline · status 16 Oct 2026Read the full story →
Harborline
Aug 2025
Cancelled
Gate 0
Feb 2026
Go
Stage 1
Business case
Gate 1
Apr 2026
Recycled
Gate 1
Jun 2026
Go w/ conditions
Stage 2
Development
You are here
Gate 2
Apr 2027
Gate 3
Oct 2027
Gate 4
Feb 2028
Launch
Mar 2028
Gate 5
Sep 2028

Lighthouse Financial Services Company — Gate 5 convened 07 September 2028 to review the closed post-launch measurement window, 06 Mar 2028 to 01 Sep 2028 (179 days). Gate 5 is not an authorization gate: it uses no score bands and cannot stop a product already in the market. Its mandate is to hold the business case to account and transfer benefit ownership.

-12.1%
Premium vs plan (window)
-7.6%
Average case size
-4.8%
Policies issued
+6% pts
Rider election vs assumption
Contents
  1. What Gate 5 Can and Cannot Read
  2. Actual Against What Gate 1 Was Told
  3. Where the Business Case Was Wrong, and in Which Direction
  4. The Measure That Beat Plan, and Why That Is Not Good News
  5. Did the Gate 1 Conditions Achieve What They Were Issued to Achieve?
  6. Did the Board Depart From Its Own Score Bands?
  7. Benefit Ownership Transfer
  8. Findings Carried Forward

1. What Gate 5 Can and Cannot Read

Gate 5 sits 185 days after launch and reviews a 179-day window. That is not long enough to read most of what the business case turns on, and the review states the limitation before it states any result.

BenefitReadable?Basis
BEN-01 Premium volumePartial179 days of sales against a pro-rated plan
BEN-02 Rider electionPartialElection rate on policies issued in the window
BEN-04 Average case sizePartialMean premium per policy issued
BEN-05 Crediting mixPartialAllocation at issue; reallocation behavior unobserved
BEN-03 PersistencyNoRequires a full policy year. No policy has reached its first anniversary.
BEN-06 Capital efficiencyNoRequires 12 months in force. Statutory experience is not yet meaningful.
The two measures Gate 5 cannot read are the two most likely to move the return. Persistency drives the entire run-off shape, and capital efficiency is the exact ratio whose 87 basis point misstatement caused the Gate 1 recycle. The Board is therefore closing its final review on the four softest measures available, and this review declines to issue a confident verdict on the business case. Recording that limitation is the finding — a Gate 5 that reported a clean outcome on partial data would be the most dangerous document this program produced.

2. Actual Against What Gate 1 Was Told

MeasureGate 1 planActualVariance
Premium written in the window$110,448,000$97,119,000-12.1%
Policies issued936891-4.8%
Average case size$118,000$109,000-7.6%
GLWB rider election62%68%+6% pts
Share into the capped indexed strategy61%Concentrated
The shortfall decomposes exactly, and the decomposition matters more than the total. A -4.8% movement in policy count multiplied by a -7.6% movement in case size produces the -12.1% premium result. Those two failures have different causes and different remedies: fewer policies is a distribution problem, smaller policies is an advisor-mix or positioning problem. Reporting only the -12.1% headline would have pointed the carrier at one lever when two are moving.

3. Where the Business Case Was Wrong, and in Which Direction

Gate 5's mandate requires the error to be recorded specifically, not as an aggregate variance.

The case assumedDirection of error
Year 1 volume achievable through the existing IMO channelOptimistic. The channel delivered -12.1% against a pro-rated plan — inside the tolerance the Benefits Realization Plan modeled, but in the direction it warned about.
Average case size of $118,000Optimistic. Actual $109,000. Not previously flagged as a risk by any register.
Rider election of 62%Understated. Actual 68% — see §4.
Crediting strategy demand would spread across the three launch strategiesWrong. 61% concentrated in one strategy — risk R-12 realizing, exactly as raised in dissent at Gate 1.
If the observed shortfall persisted across the full five-year forecast, the model returns an IRR of 12.2% against the 11.0% hurdle, with NPV at the hurdle of $5,239,324. The case would still clear — the breakeven is a 23% shortfall — but with materially less headroom than Gate 1 was shown. This is a projection on 179 days of data and is presented as an indication, not a re-forecast.

4. The Measure That Beat Plan, and Why That Is Not Good News

Rider election came in at 68% against a 62% pricing assumption — +6% percentage points. It is the only measure in §2 that exceeded plan, and it would be easy to report it as the review's one bright line.

Higher rider election is more guarantee exposure than was priced and hedged. The GLWB is the source of the product's fee income and of its long-tail risk. Electing it above assumption increases both, and the hedging program — whose readiness was the program's highest-scoring open risk throughout (R-05) — was sized against the lower number. Combined with 61% of premium concentrating into a single crediting strategy (R-12), the product is carrying a risk profile the business case did not describe. A review that celebrated this line would have misread it.

5. Did the Gate 1 Conditions Achieve What They Were Issued to Achieve?

The standing efficacy question, asked one final time with outcomes available.

IDVerdict at Gate 5
GC-01Effective, and vindicated. Cutting to three strategies removed a dependency the platform could not carry. The concentration it created (R-12) did materialize — but it was disclosed as a consequence at the time, not discovered here.
GC-02Effective. The New York exclusion held; no launch-scope pressure arose from it.
GC-03Effective as a control. The external review confirmed the pricing basis. Whether the basis was right cannot be answered here — that is BEN-03 and BEN-06, and Gate 5 cannot read either.
GC-04The efficacy finding recorded in 2026 was correct. The condition produced written evidence of a shortfall and could not close it; the shortfall then materialized at -12.1%. A condition that surfaces a problem it cannot solve is still worth issuing — but only if somebody acts on what it surfaces, and the record shows the gap was disclosed and carried rather than closed.
GC-05Closed late, and the risk it addressed outlived it. Hedging readiness was achieved before launch. The rider-election variance at §4 means the hedging program is now operating against a larger book of guarantees than it was designed around.

6. Did the Board Depart From Its Own Score Bands?

Framework §5 requires departures from the score bands to be reviewed here. There were none. Gate 0 scored 3.85 and carried GO; Gate 1 scored 3.20, inside the conditions band, and carried GO WITH CONDITIONS. The Board followed its own framework at every convening.

The one procedural event worth recording is not a departure but a near-miss. At the first Gate 1 convening two criteria were rated U — unscoreable — and the framework required the Chair to table a recycle. Had the scale lacked a U, an assessor would have entered a 3 on each, the weighted score would have landed near the conditions band, and the program would have proceeded on evidence that did not exist. The capital charge error would have been carried into Stage 2 with $11,640,000 committed against it. The U rating is the single mechanism in this framework that changed the outcome of a gate.

7. Benefit Ownership Transfer

Gate 5 dissolves the Gate Review Board. Measurement obligations transfer as specified in the Benefits Realization Plan §8: monthly volume, case size and crediting mix to the product line; the annual experience study covering persistency, rider utilization and capital efficiency to Corporate Actuarial; annual reporting of return against the Gate 1 case to the CFO.

Gap BG-01 stands unresolved at closure. None of these obligations is compelled by contract, charter clause or standing committee mandate. Every party named could decline without breaching anything. The Board records the transfer and notes that it has no instrument to enforce it — which is the honest position, and the one thing this review would most want a successor program to fix.

8. Findings Carried Forward

  1. Volume tolerance was consumed before launch and nobody re-planned. Written commitments sat 9.2% below the Year 1 target at Gate 2 — two fifths of the available tolerance — and the program carried the gap rather than closing it. The shortfall that arrived was the one that had been visible for eighteen months.
  2. Average case size was never on any register. It moved -7.6% and contributed more to the premium miss than policy count did. No risk, assumption or condition addressed it.
  3. A benefit beating plan can be bad news, and the framework had no way to say so. Rider election exceeded assumption and increased exposure. Nothing in the gate criteria distinguishes a favorable variance from an unfavorable one of the same sign.
  4. The final gate cannot see the decisive measures. Persistency and capital efficiency are unreadable at Gate 5 by construction. A successor program should either move Gate 5 later or accept explicitly that its last governance event is provisional.
  5. The U rating earned its place. It is the only mechanism that altered a gate outcome, and it did so by refusing to let an absence of evidence be scored as mediocre evidence.

Prepared by C. Tyrrell, NPD Program Manager and Chair of the Gate Review Board. Approving authority: G. Marchetti, Chief Product Officer. Related: Benefits Realization Plan · Gate Conditions Register · Gate Decision Framework §12 · Cost-Benefit Analysis.